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Gender Differences in Response to Contingent Rewards:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment of Junior Tennis

Abstract

We investigate gender differences in responding to contingent rewards by exploiting a
natural experiment in junior tennis tournaments in Florida where the ranking point
system is revised to increase players’ incentives to play more doubles matches. We
examine three types of potential rational responses to the new system; 1) a ‘positive
response’ by players, who win their first match, to play doubles more, 2) a ‘subversive
response’ by players, who lose their first singles match, to play doubles less, and 3) a
‘slack response’ by players, who win their first singles match, to play loosely in their
doubles matches. We detect a ‘positive response’ among boys. Although there is no
‘positive response’ among girls overall, there is a ‘positive response’ by top-ranked
girls to contingent rewards just like boys. We find no evidence for either a subversive
or slack response by both genders.

JEL classification: D01, D03
Keywords: Gender differences, contingent rewards, positive response, negative
response, subversive response

1. Introduction
Theoretical and empirical economic studies teem with findings that individuals respond to
incentives, and especially to rewards that are contingent upon effective performance. Different
genders, however, may exhibit different degrees of response to contingent rewards in a given
activity. 1 Thus, gender may be another critical factor besides standard economic variables that one
may have to consider regarding compensation schemes, motivation, and various other incentive
mechanisms overall. 2
In this paper, to shed more light on gender differences in response to contingent rewards,
we exploit a natural experiment in junior tennis tournaments – a change in the point system
instituted by the governing United States Tennis Association (USTA) Florida Section, which
applied to ‘Super Series’ tournaments. Points are important for junior players’ careers towards
college scholarships, if not towards professional play later. Points determine rankings, and points
earned at the local or state level tournaments are needed to qualify for higher national-level
tournaments at each age group. The aim of the institutional change was to encourage junior players
to play more doubles matches, as conveyed by the USTA-Florida on their website. Doubles
matches were not very popular before, because singles’ rankings points were not affected by
winning or losing those matches. Under the new point system which started in 2005, if at least 2/3
of players in their sex-age group played doubles, the points earned from wins in singles matches
increased by roughly 75%; otherwise, players received their base points.
Under the old point system, many players already had some incentive to play doubles
regardless of the outcome of their singles matches - simply to hone their tennis skills because the
tournament fee is a sunk cost once that tournament is entered and there is no additional fee for the

1

See Croson and Gneezy (2009) (and the references therein) for the recent literature regarding gender differences in
preferences. Differences in preferences, such as preferences for competition or risk aversion, may explain why men
and women respond differently to incentives (Gneezy et al. 2003; Booth and Nolen 2012). According to the social
psychology literature, human behavior can be provoked by intrinsic motivation (values or norms) as well as extrinsic
motivations (James Jr. 2005). Observed behavioral differences between men and women may reflect differences in
motivation.

2 For example, Cawley et al. (2013) find that at elementary school, for girls, additional physical education (PE)
time crowds out participation in individual sports and playground activities. For boys, on the other hand, additional
PE time increases structured sports activities, free-time physical activity, and aerobic exercise. They conclude that
“PE time and other types of physical activity may be complements for boys, but substitutes for girls.” This example
shows that a policy regarding PE time can have different consequences between genders.

doubles part of that tournament. 3 This honing motivation to improve one’s tennis skills exists in
the new point system as well. The new point system, however, added new and more concrete
incentives regarding playing doubles for players who won at least their first singles match. This is
because, as always, players who lose their first singles matches are eliminated from the singles
tournament without any points, and the ones who win at least their first singles match could earn higher
points under the new regime than before and would continue playing in further rounds to earn even
more magnified points - if at least 2/3 of players in their sex-age group played doubles, as mentioned

above.
An important detail is that, for practical logistical reasons such as court availability, in
tennis tournaments doubles matches do not start until all the second-round singles matches are
over, and players are allowed to have a significant rest time between their second-round singles
match and their first-round doubles match if they decide to play doubles. Thus, players have a
significant amount of time to decide or strategize whether to sign up to play doubles or not after
their second-round singles matches are over.
We will examine three types of rational responses to the new point system. First, those
players who win their first singles match (simply “winners” hereafter) would be more likely to
participate in doubles to increase their earned points for their first match wins as well as their
option values in the rest of their singles matches in the tournament – a “positive response” of
winners to contingent rewards. Second, those players who lose their first singles match (simply
“losers” hereafter) could refrain from playing doubles in order not to allow the winners to gain
more grounds against themselves – a “subversive response” to contingent rewards. Third, since
the singles ranking was the only ranking that really mattered for their career at that time, there is a
potential incentive issue in that winners could put out much more effort in the dimension where it
is rewarded and perform perfunctorily (to minimize effort) in the doubles matches they would play
to increase their singles points by focusing more than further singles matches in the tournament –
thus, the positive response of the winners could involve a “slack response” by them to contingent
rewards as a negative by-product.

3

As is generally agreed, “it’s more interesting to play a match of doubles than to practice”
(http://blogs.wsj.com/dailyfix/2009/09/05/doubles-tennis-more-fun-than-practice/). In addition, a typical tennis
lesson for an hour involves a coaching fee of at least $70-75.

Using a novel data set on 3,887 players and their 10,405 decisions to play or not in doubles
matches in 77 junior tournaments during the years of 2004 and 2005, we find a ‘positive response’
among boys regardless of their rankings. Although there is no ‘positive response’ by girls overall, topranked girls respond to contingent rewards just like boys. We find no evidence for either a boys

respond to contingent rewards positively but not subversively. This is true regardless of their
ranking.

2. Decision to Play Junior Tennis Doubles
Before proceeding to data and empirical analysis, we explain some details about the doubles’ signup process. On the first day of a tournament, a sign-up sheet is posted for each age group which is
visible to all players – i.e., the sheet is posted either on the main door of the facility or next to the
draws board or placed at the tournament desk. A player, with the consent of his doubles partner,
can sign up for both of them or both of the partners can sign up simultaneously or sequentially
next to each other’s name. Players without a partner are allowed to sign up alone as well, so that
somebody else without a partner may add his/her name next to that player’s name to form a doubles
pair with him/her for that tournament. Players can withdraw their entry by crossing over their own
names - and also their partner’s name with the consent of their partner. Any withdrawal from the
doubles tournament is observed by all other players if they glance at the sign-up sheet from time
to time.
The doubles partners who have the intention to enter a doubles tournament strategically
(i.e., contingent upon how many other pairs are also playing in that tournament) may withdraw or
sign up in the last moments they are allowed to do so. Typically right before 5pm of the first day
of the tournament when the second-round of singles matches are already done, first-round “byes”
- those who advance to the second round without playing in the first round - also know whether
they earned any positive points after their win or loss in the second round of singles (there are no
second-round byes, so all players play finish at least one singles match by the end of the first day
and know whether they have earned any points or not). Consequently, if some doubles partners
who lost their first matches in singles do not want to be ‘pivotal’ in terms of helping the players
who won their first singles matches reach the 2/3 threshold and obtain much higher points, then
they can withdraw from the doubles tournament – i.e., if they were going to be pivotal by staying

on the sign-up sheet. 4
How do doubles partners decide whether to enter doubles or not after their singles matches
on the first day? The etiquette regarding that is not very complicated. Suppose that one partner
loses and the other one wins in their first singles matches. The loser feels obliged to play doubles
with the partner who won his/her first singles match especially if they already signed up for
doubles. 5 On the other hand, if both players in a doubles partnership win or lose their first-round
singles matches, then it may be likely that they reach the same decision in terms of what to do
regarding doubles play.

3. Data and Empirical Model
We collected data on 3,887 players and their 10,405 decisions to play or not in doubles matches in
a total of 77 junior tournaments in 2004, before the regime change, and 2005, under the new
system. 6 The number of decisions is 5,191 in 2004 and 5,214 in 2005. There are 329 gender-agetournament combinations in 2004 and 330 in 2005. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
About 62% of players are boys. Players play tournament in each of five age groups; 10, 12, 14, 16
and 18. 27% of players are awarded with a bye (i.e., directly advancing to the second round). The
proportion of players awarded with a bye is slightly higher for girls (32%). 7 Figure 1 shows the
histogram of the number of singles matches played by a player per year. There is little difference
4

If they are not pivotal (i.e., already more than 2/3 of players stay signed-up around the deadline or sufficiently
fewer people than 2/3 of players signed up by then so that their signing up won’t make the total number of players
entering the doubles tournament reach the 2/3 threshold), then they would stay in the doubles sign-up sheet or add
their names to that list if their names are not already there since it would be the dominant strategy for them given the
practice/investment value of the doubles matches for themselves, unless they are the types of players who do not like
playing doubles.
5

If the loser does not want to play doubles with the pre-arranged on-going partner, then their long-term stability of
that partnership would be in danger. Breaking such commitments may affect even these players’ friendships outside
the courts and these friendships are typically very valuable to these players who train in the same academy or have
been hanging out together between matches in tournaments.
6

As our data set includes all junior tennis tournaments in Florida in which singles and doubles matches are played
together, we avoid having a sample selection bias. (We should also note that round-robin tournaments are excluded
from our data, for obvious reasons.)

7

The byes always go highest ranked players in a tournament: “The byes shall go to seeded players in descending
order. … If there more byes than seeded players, then the byes shall be positioned on the lines opposite the lines
where additional seeds would have been positioned had the draw been full and had the tournament seeded one in
four players. (For example, in a draw of twenty five with 4 seeds and 7 byes, the first four byes would go on lines
opposite seeds 1 through 4 and the next three byes would go on lines opposite the lines where seeds 5 through 7
would have gone” (USTA 2012, p. 87).

between boys and girls. There are a bit more frequent players among boys. For example, 16 percent
of boys played more than three matches, while 13 percent of girls did.
The point system reform provides us a natural experimental setting in which we can
estimate the causal effect of the new incentive by the difference-in-differences method. We
compare players’ decisions to play doubles in 2004 (before the rule change) with those in 2005
(after the change). And we compare those whose incentive to play doubles increased, i.e., the
winners, with the losers. Our estimation model is therefore the following:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝐷𝐷05 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐷𝐷05 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(1)

where the dependent variable is the dummy variable which equals one if player i played doubles
(contingent on playing singles) in tournament k in year t = 2004, 2005. We estimate the linear
probability model, while Probit or Logit models give similar results (which we can provide upon
request). 𝐷𝐷05 is the indicator for year 2005 (after the regime change). 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates whether the

player is the winner of his or her first-singles match. The interaction between the two explanatory
variables will capture the effect of the regime change on the player’s decision to play doubles.
We include some control variables in vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 such as the player’s “age” (indicating

not his physical age, which is kept confidential by the USTA, but in which age group the player
played in a particular tournament) and whether the player has advanced to the second round

without playing in the first round having a bye. These bye players are top players by the USTA
rules, as mentioned before. We control for tournament-specific fixed effects (𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 ) as well as

individual-player-specific fixed effects (𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 ). The individual-player-specific fixed effect should
absorb most of each player’s ability.

Next we estimate Equation (1) by separating bye players and non-bye players. We expect
that the responsiveness to the new contingent rewards (i.e., to magnified singles points) should be
different according to players’ rankings. Top-ranked players should be more serious about their
ranking points, so they may attempt to exploit the new point system more. To test for the hypothesis,
we estimate the following equation:

𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝐷𝐷05 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ∙ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷05 ∙ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ∙ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2)

+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐷𝐷05 ∙ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

where 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 indicates that the player got a bye at the first round, and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 1 − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵

indicates that the player did not get a bye. In this specification, the triple interaction terms (𝛽𝛽3𝐵𝐵 and

𝛽𝛽3𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) capture the treatment effects.
4. Empirical Results

A. Positive and Subversive Response to Rewards
Table 2 presents unconditional difference-in-difference estimates for all players and by gender. In
2004, before the point system reform, about 45% of the first-singles-match winners played doubles,
while 34% of the losers did. That is, even under the old point system, the winners were more likely
to play doubles. This is perhaps because the winners are better players and they want to improve
more by playing more matches, be it singles or doubles. As expected, the gap between the winners
and losers became larger in 2005 after the new point system was adopted. The winners are 7.4%
points more likely to play doubles under the new system than before. This is the first bit of evidence
for the positive response by players to contingent rewards.
It is surprising that losers also played more doubles in 2005. This implies that there is no
subversive response. By a simple economic logic, the losers would be less eager to play doubles
under this new regime, not to help the winners to earn more points and achieve an additional
advantage over them (i.e., to subvert winners). In this natural experiment, however, it turns out
that the positive response of male winners contingent rewards happens without an undermining
response of losers to contingent rewards; i.e., there is no displacement of the former positive
response by a latter-type negative response. 8 The unconditional difference-in-difference estimate
based on Table 2 is 0.045, statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The middle and bottom
panels show the same statistics, separated by gender. For boys, the new point system induces

8

One reason for this lack of displacement could be that, as mentioned above, the USTA-Florida officials announced
at their website that the new regime starting in 2005 was introduced in order to put more emphasis on doubles play.
Junior players in Florida, first-round winners and losers alike, may have taken such an official goal/message
seriously and internalized it to an extent.

winners to play doubles while there is no response from losers. For girls, there is no such a positive
response from winners across-the-board while female losers played more doubles under the new
point system, although the effect is statistically marginal.
Table 3 presents regression results after controlling for player characteristics, tournament
and individual player fixed effects. Column 1 and 3 present the results for boys, and Column 2 and
4 the results for girls. In Column 1 and 2, we estimate Equation (1), and in Column 3 and 4,
Equation (2), separating bye (and thus, supposedly top-ranked) players from non-bye players.
Overall the results confirm our simple difference-in difference estimates in Table 2. In fact, after
including control variables and fixed effects, the effects get larger. The results in Column 1 show
that the new point system increases the propensity for male players to play doubles by 9.8
percentage points. On the other hand, there is no significant effect for girls overall.
The results detect that there is a clear gender difference. Boys and girls are different in
their response to contingent rewards in that while overall all boys, regardless of their rankings,
positively respond to these rewards positively only the top-ranked girls respond positively to such
rewards. We cannot explore further as to why boys and girls respond differently to such rewards,
but it is conceivable that boys overall are more serious about competition (Croson and Gneezy
2009).
The results in Column 3 and 4 are intriguing. We find that male bye players are 13
percentage points more likely to play doubles under the new point system. Even male non-bye
players are 10 percentage points more likely to play doubles. Both effects are statistically
significant. 9 On the other hand, for girls, we find no significant response from non-bye players.
But, like male players, female bye players are 10 percentage points more likely to play doubles
under the new point system. Our results suggest that top female players do respond to contingent
rewards. In other words, the gender difference does not exist among top players.

9

Both singles and doubles draws can accommodate 32 players at most. As mentioned above, in 2004, before the
point system reform, about 45% of the first-singles-match winners played doubles while 34% of the losers did.
Thus, most doubles draws involved significantly lower numbers of players than singles draws. In 2005, when 10+%
more male singles players played doubles, consequently the number of players in doubles draws came marginally
closer to the number of players in singles draws but the former number never converged to the latter number.

B. Slack Response to Rewards
Another prediction of standard economic logic is that those players who choose to play doubles to
increase their singles points could try less hard in their doubles matches. They have singles matches
to play ahead, thus could minimize their efforts in doubles matches which simply may not mean
much to them beyond their participation in the first doubles match to have higher points.
To test for this hypothesis, we estimate the same empirical model replacing the dependent
variable with the indicator of whether they won their first doubles match. According to the slack
response hypothesis, we expect that the coefficient of the interaction term should be negative. That
is, those players who are induced to play doubles by the new system should be less likely to win
their first doubles matches. Since the dependent variable is now an outcome of performance rather
than players’ decisions, it is critical to control for players’ ability. For example, it is conceivable
that singles winners are better players and therefore they should be better at doubles as well. In
this sense, controlling for individual player fixed effects is crucial.
The results in Table 4 do not support the hypothesis. In the previous section we found that
boys played more doubles under the new system. The results here indicate that, once they choose
to play doubles, they do not shirk and try hard in doubles as well. One possible explanation is that
these young players still respect norms of sportsmanship and, as a result, a positive response of the
boys winners to contingent rewards does not lead to a weak effort (or slack) response in their
doubles matches.

5. Conclusion
In this paper, using a natural experiment, we investigate whether teenage tennis players respond to
contingent rewards and whether different genders respond differently. After controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity at the player and tournament levels, we find significant gender
differences that male junior players positively respond to contingent rewards to play more doubles.
This response can be found regardless of male players’ rankings. The results for girls are more
complicated and interesting. Only top female players respond to these rewards like male players.
In terms of similarities between two genders, we found that the positive response of winners to
contingent rewards is not accompanied by any subversive response from losers. In fact, female
losers played more doubles after the point system reform. Also there is no evidence for a slack
response of winners in doubles for boys and girls.

Our findings suggest that an incentive system can work for men and women differently. It
is difficult to understand why they respond differently to an incentive. In our study, boys might be
more competitive and may try harder to achieve a higher ranking. Boys might be more serious
about reaching a future college career with a sports scholarship. Or it could be parents or coaches
who push boys to respond more to contingent rewards (in which case the observed gender
differences would actually be resulting from adults’ different treatments of boys and girls). Clearly,
further evidence on gender differences in responses to incentives would be warranted.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics

Boy
Age
Year 2005 (the new point system)
Singles matches played per year
First singles match won
Bye
Played doubles
Number of players
Number of tournaments
Number of observations
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.

All
0.62
(0.49)
14.1
(2.5)
0.50
(0.50)
3.20
(2.20)
0.52
(0.50)
0.27
(0.45)
0.43
(0.50)
3,887
77
10,405

Boys
--

Girls
--

14.1
(2.5)
0.49
(0.50)
3.40
(2.30)
0.53
(0.50)
0.24
(0.43)
0.44
(0.50)
2,354
77
6,427

14.0
(2.5)
0.51
(0.50)
3.00
(1.90)
0.52
(0.50)
0.32
(0.47)
0.32
(0.41)
1,534
73
3,978

Table 2. Probability of Playing Doubles: Simple Difference-in-Differences Estimate

A. All Players

Before
After
Difference

First singles match
Winner
Loser
0.446
0.338
[0.497]
[0.473]
0.520
0.367
[0.500]
[0.482]
0.074***
0.029*
[0.016]
[0.016]

Difference
0.108***
(0.016)
0.153***
(0.016)
0.045**
(0.022)

B. Boys

Before
After
Difference

First singles match
Winner
Loser
0.444
0.349
[0.477]
[0.477]
0.552
0.371
[0.498]
[0.483]
0.109***
0.022
[0.020]
[0.019]

Difference
0.095***
(0.020)
0.182***
(0.020)
0.087***
(0.028)

C. Girls

Before
After
Difference

First singles match
Winner
Loser
0.449
0.316
[0.498]
[0.465]
0.464
0.361
[0.499]
[0.481]
0.015
0.045*
[0.027]
[0.026]

Difference
0.133***
(0.027)
0.103***
(0.026)
-0.030
(0.038)

Notes: Standard deviations are in brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** 1%
significant; ** 5% significant; * 10% significant.

Table 3. Decision to Play Doubles after First Singles Match

(1)
Boys

(2)
Girls

(3)
Boys

(4)
Girls

-0.021
(0.036)
0.099***
(0.025)

0.022
(0.045)
0.059*
(0.032)

-0.022
(0.036)

0.025
(0.045)

0.098***
(0.034)

0.053
(0.043)

First singles won×Bye

0.111**
(0.044)

0.007
(0.050)

First singles won×No Bye

0.097***
(0.027)

0.090**
(0.037)

First singles won×Bye×2005

0.130**
(0.052)

0.102*
(0.057)

First singles won×No Bye×2005

0.086**
(0.036)
0.024
(0.033)
0.0002
(0.0084)
0.316***
(0.107)
Yes
Yes
Yes
6,427
0.274

0.021
(0.048)
0.022
(0.035)
0.0001
(0.0109)
-0.004
(0.123)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,978
0.316

Year 2005
First singles won
First singles won×Year 2005

Bye
# singles played per year
Constant
Age group fixed effects
Tournament fixed effects
Individual player fixed effects
Observations
Adj. R-squared

0.046**
(0.023)
0.0004
(0.0084)
0.305***
(0.107)
Yes
Yes
Yes
6,427
0.273

-0.003
(0.023)
-0.0005
(0.0110)
0.005
(0.123)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,978
0.315

Notes: Robust standard errors, corrected by clustering for individual players, are in parentheses. ×
represents multiplication (interaction term). *** 1% significant; ** 5% significant; * 10% significant.

Table 4. Winning at First Doubles Match

(1)
Boys

(2)
Girls

(3)
Boys

(4)
Girls

0.106
(0.072)
0.081
(0.053)

0.150
(0.104)
0.049
(0.081)

0.104
(0.072)

0.147
(0.103)

-0.034
(0.069)

0.025
(0.098)

First singles won×Bye

0.074
(0.088)

0.149
(0.113)

First singles won×No Bye

0.086
(0.059)

-0.017
(0.093)

First singles won×Bye×2005

0.019
(0.097)

0.027
(0.115)

First singles won×No Bye×2005

-0.054
(0.073)
0.019
(0.075)
-0.0005
(0.0162)
0.0674
(0.2270)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,850
0.183

0.030
(0.111)
-0.079
(0.091)
0.0021
(0.0248)
0.2957
(0.2391)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,628
0.186

Year 2005
First singles won
First singles won×Year 2005

Bye
# singles played per year
Constant
Age group fixed effects
Tournament fixed effects
Individual player fixed effects
Observations
Adj. R-squared

0.039
(0.043)
-0.0001
(0.0161)
0.049
(0.227)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,850
0.183

0.035
(0.058)
0.0012
(0.0251)
0.268
(0.239)
Yes
Yes
Yes
1,628
0.182

Notes: Robust standard errors, corrected by clustering for individual players, are in parentheses.
represents multiplication (interaction term).

×

Figure 1. Number of Singles Matches Played Per Year
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